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ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES IN THE AGRIFOOD SECTOR:
TOWARD A COMPARATIVE APPROACH
CLAUDE ME´NARD AND PETER G. KLEIN
International comparisons are increasingly
popular in empirical studies of economic or-
ganization, financial-market performance, and
political economy. Besides providing a broad
set of firms and industries to compare, these
studies highlight the interaction between the
institutional environment—the “rules of the
game,” such as property rights, the legal sys-
tem, the political process, and social norms—
and the organizational arrangements trading
partners design to govern their relationships.
The “law and finance” approach (LaPorta,
Lopez-de-Silenas, and Shleifer) suggests that
the origin of a country’s legal system (En-
glish Common Law, French Civil Law, and so
on) largely explains the organization and de-
velopment of financial markets and corpora-
tions, though the relationship may be more
subtle and complex than originally thought
(Roe). Similarly, recent studies of contracting
and regulatory practices find that implementa-
tion and performance of comparable contrac-
tual arrangements vary systematically with a
country’s political and legal systems (Levy and
Spiller, Shirley and Me´nard).
The comparative approach can also be use-
fully applied to organizational change in food
and agriculture. Recent U.S. trends, such as
consolidation, vertical integration, and the
emergence of new network organizations, are
also observed in Europe and the develop-
ing world. Comparing the nature, causes, and
consequences of these trends across countries
helps us see what forms of organization are
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feasible, which ones work best under various
circumstances, and how legal, political, and so-
cial factors affect organizational choice and
performance.
This article outlines a research program
comparing the economic organization of agri-
culture in the United States and European
Union (EU). While both have highly devel-
oped agricultural sectors, there is substan-
tial variation in organizational arrangements
between and within the two. History and
path dependence explain some of this va-
riety, but other local conditions are impor-
tant as well. For instance, European farms
tend to be smaller than U.S. farms and more
tightly interwoven with cities and tourist ar-
eas, so European agriculture is more closely
tied with local economic, demographic, and
cultural issues.
There are also important differences within
countries and regions. Growing olives is dif-
ferent from raising livestock. Moreover, vari-
ation in the dominant modes of organization
between the United States and EU and within
the EU are partly responsible for ongoing ten-
sions and policy disagreements over the na-
ture and type of subsidies, the role of regional
development, quality control and traceability,
food aid to developing countries, and similar
issues.
We begin by discussing recent trends toward
horizontal and vertical integration. The sec-
ond section looks at network modes of orga-
nization. The third section identifies key issues
likely to be important in the coming years, par-
ticularly with respect to agricultural policies.
Part of the research reported in this article
involves our research centers, the Center for
Analytical Theory of Organizations and Mar-
kets (ATOM) at the University of Paris
(Panthe´on-Sorbonne) and the Contracting
and Organizations Research Institute (CORI)
at the University of Missouri. Both centers
sponsor interdisciplinary research on the eco-
nomics of contracting and organizational form
in the agrifood and other sectors.
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The Trend toward Integration
and Tighter Coordination
Over the last century, the dominant trend in
agricultural production, both in the United
States and the EU, has been consolidation.
In 1920, the United States had about 6.5 mil-
lion farms with an average of 149 acres per
farm. In 1997, there were fewer than 2 mil-
lion farms, averaging 487 acres per farm. The
European situation is similar: In France, the
EU’s leading agricultural producer with 21%
of total production in 2000, there were 660,000
farms that year compared to over 2 million in
1958. The average French farm in 2000 had
104 acres compared to half that area forty years
earlier. The processing and distribution sec-
tors are also becoming more concentrated. The
twenty largest U.S. grocers had a combined
market share of 48.2% in 1998, up from 37% in
1992. The thirty largest European grocers held
68.5% of the market in 2001, up from 51.5%
in 1992 (French and German companies dom-
inate the top ten with 41% of the market).
At the same time, farming—unlike virtually
every other mature industry—has remained
largely a family-owned business. In the United
States, corporate farms in 1997 held only 1.2%
of total farm acreage and generated only 5.6%
of total sales receipts. In France, 75% of farms
are family owned with no employees. Allen
and Lueck argue that this ownership pattern
results from agriculture’s unique combination
of seasonality and random variation, which
makes it difficult to design and enforce effec-
tive incentive contracts that minimize moral
hazard. Instead, sole proprietorships, with the
farmer or farm family as residual claimant, out-
perform joint ownership arrangements, such as
corporations.
The combination of dispersed family own-
ership and highly concentrated processing and
distribution sectors poses unique challenges,
particularly with respect to vertical coordi-
nation and quality control over the supply
chain. Large processors and distributors have
shifted from spot-market exchange to con-
tracts and formal negotiating bodies for coor-
dinating the production process. Indeed, the
rapid increase in tightly integrated vertical ar-
rangements, such as production and market-
ing contracts, is one of the most dramatic
changes in the agricultural production process
in recent decades both in the United States
(Martinez and Reed, Royer and Rogers) and
in Europe.
Vertical coordination accomplishes several
purposes. Processors wish to control their sup-
ply chains more tightly to satisfy consumer
demands for quality and safety. In the EU,
new regulations making large retailers liable
for the quality and identity preservation of
the food they sell impose a new set of prob-
lems that vertical coordination may alleviate.
Similarly, new quality certification and grad-
ing systems for protecting consumers that have
emerged in Europe over the last ten years re-
quire tighter coordination.1 Contracts and ver-
tical integration may also generate efficiency
gains by reducing transaction costs (Frank and
Henderson). These objectives can be achieved
using a variety of organizational arrangements
from vertical integration to production or mar-
keting contracts to formal or informal negoti-
ating arrangements.
In Europe, there is substantial variety
among contracts across countries, even within
industries. Vertical integration or tight vertical
control led by large retailers is largely devel-
oped among northern members of EU (U.K.,
Germany, and the Scandinavian countries).
Complex contractual arrangements among
hundreds or even thousands of participants
are common in France, Italy, the Netherlands,
and to a lesser degree Spain, particularly for
developing and marketing products of “Pro-
tected Designations of Origin” and “Protected
Geographical Indications” as well as organic
products. Small independent producers that
are less coordinated and tend to focus on local
or regional markets are common in Southern
Europe (Greece, Portugal, and parts of Spain,
Italy, and France).2
Moreover, we observe many types of con-
tract even within an industry in a particu-
lar country, and these contracts appear to
serve very different purposes. An extensive
study of over 20,000 contracts in the poultry
industry in France showed a differentiation
among three types of contracts—“fixed-price,”
“buy-and-sell,” and “putting-out” contracts—
that clearly related to the degree of spe-
cific investments (Me´nard). Recent studies on
contractual agreements in France and in the
1 Examples are EU regulation 2081/92, defining protected des-
ignation and origins, the adoption and implementation of EUROP
(European Union Grading System) in the livestock sector, or the
recommendations of the EU White Paper on Food Safety (2000).
2 A collaborative research project on methods for quality con-
trol by seven European research groups in as many countries illus-
trates this variety. See preliminary results in Raynaud, Sauve´e, and
Valceschini.
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EU also show changes regarding the content
of contracts (Maze´; Raynaud, Sauve´e, and
Valceschini). These arrangements involve an
increasing number of detailed clauses regard-
ing quality and the control and monitoring pro-
cesses that render inputs traceable, all of which
require increasingly tight control of the supply
chain. Interestingly, these contracts are largely
imposed by concentrated retailers.3
Why the variety in forms of vertical coordi-
nation? Within countries, transaction-cost con-
siderations are important. In the United States,
for example, virtually all poultry, turkey, and
eggs are produced under contract or vertical
integration, though precise arrangements vary
widely (Martinez). Egg production is highly
vertically integrated while poultry and turkey
production rely more on production contracts.
In France, over 80% of the growers in the poul-
try industry operated under contracts in 1994
(Me´nard). In the U.S. pork industry, about 72%
of total hogs were sold through marketing con-
tracts in 2001 (Martinez).
These production and transformation pro-
cesses are all increasingly mechanized and sub-
ject to quality standards that require highly
specialized equipment. As emphasized in the
transaction-cost literature (Joskow, Klein),
relationship-specific investments give rise to
potential “hold-ups,” which are best mitigated
through contract or vertical integration. Egg,
poultry, and turkey production is characterized
by high degrees of physical asset specificity,
and, because of perishability, site, and tempo-
ral specificity. Because hogs can be transported
greater distances without losing value, and can
be slaughtered at different ages, site and tem-
poral specificities are less important in the pork
industry where (less tightly coordinated) mar-
keting contracts appear sufficient to mitigate
opportunism.
The lesson from this brief tour of vertical
relationships within the U.S. and European
agrifood sectors is that the nature and pur-
poses of particular contractual arrangements
can best be understood in comparison with al-
ternative arrangements observed in other in-
dustries, countries, and regions. Comparisons
should also allow better understanding of why
some modes of organization are better adapted
to certain transactions and how institutional
factors affect the choice of organization.
3 The development of a database on contracts at CORI and a
similar (but smaller) initiative at ATOM should help facilitate lon-
gitudinal and cross-country analysis. On the CORI contracts col-
lection see Sykuta and James.
Trend toward Network Organizations
Collaborative or network organizations, such
as cooperatives, joint ventures, and other
“hybrids,” have always been important in
U.S. and European agriculture. However, net-
work organizations among farmers and among
participants to vertically coordinated supply-
chain systems have become increasingly im-
portant in Europe during the last twenty years.
As the term “hybrid” implies, network organi-
zations represent a blend, or compromise, be-
tween the benefits of centralized coordination
and control and the incentive and informa-
tional advantages of decentralized decision-
making. While network members pool signif-
icant resources, they often rely on relational
contracts, rather than formal written agree-
ments, though they do establish some formal
mechanism for coordination.
Two complementary factors may explain the
rapid development of network organizations,
particularly in the EU. First, European agri-
cultural policy over the last half century was
designed to achieve restructuring while retain-
ing family ownership. Along with the major
concentration in distribution, this dispersed
ownership puts the coordination problem at
the center of organizational issues. Second,
European consumers have increased dramat-
ically their demands for quality certification.
The certification movement began in France
in the early 1960s with small group of poul-
try producers and took off during the late
1970s. For instance, the high-quality segment
of the poultry industry (the “red-label” sys-
tem) represented over 30% of the French poul-
try market in 1994, up from 2% in the late
1970s (Me´nard). This system, made up of a
tightly coordinated group of producers, spread
quickly to the pork and beef sectors and dif-
fused to other European countries (particu-
larly, Italy and, to a lesser extent, the Nether-
lands and Spain). This evolution was formally
endorsed by the adoption in 1992 of a certi-
fication system by the EU (Regulation 2081/
92). In other European countries, quality cer-
tification has also become more important
but is handled by private firms (brand-name
certification) or quasigovernmental organiza-
tions, such as the British “Meat and Livestock
Commission.”
As was the case with vertical coordination,
we observe substantial variety in how these
networks are organized. Three stylized types
are identifiable. First, some networks are or-
ganized around a leading firm. The leader is
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often a large processor coordinating and mon-
itoring a vast network of suppliers, eventually
spread over different countries with different
regulations and institutions. To manage these
contracts while guaranteeing regularity and
quality of supply and maintaining adequate
incentives for producers, leading firms tend to
rely on a stable network of producers. We see
this model both in the United States (Knoeber)
and in the EU (Sauve´e).
A second, more “egalitarian,” form of net-
work groups a large number of participants
with similar rights and duties. The firms that
developed the red-label system in France are
a good illustration. To guarantee quality, re-
duce contractual hazards, and prevent free
riding among legally independent partners,
mechanisms must be designed to monitor
the partners. Coordinating structures tend to
emerge with significant authority on the par-
ties (Me´nard), such as Loue´ in the European
poultry industry or Saveol in the market for
high-quality tomatoes.
The traditional U.S. producer’s cooperative
is another type of network organization. Even
here, however, there is considerable variety
and change. Traditionally organized coopera-
tives, characterized by open membership, non-
transferable ownership shares, and a narrow
product scope suffer from what Cook calls
“vaguely defined property rights,” resulting
in various conflicts of interest among mem-
bers. “New generation” cooperatives attempt
to solve these problems by restricting member-
ship, allowing transferability of equity shares,
and diversifying the organization’s product
line. Alternatively, rearranging certain owner-
ship rights within the traditional cooperative
structure can help improve members’ invest-
ment incentives (Hendrikse and Bijman).
The last decade or so has seen an explo-
sion of interest in the development of these
nonstandard modes of organization in agri-
food networks, particularly in Europe. Several
new journals, such as Supply Chain Manage-
ment, Journal of Chain and Network Science,
have devoted considerable space to agricul-
tural issues. Again, a comparative approach
can be particularly valuable. Recent U.S. and
European research projects have developed in
this direction.4
4 European examples include the project on quality control
and organizations (Raynaud, Sauve´e, and Valceschini), the SUS-
CHAIN (Marketing Sustainable Agriculture: An Analysis of the
Potential Role of New Food Supply Chains in Sustainable Rural
Although still in progress, these studies high-
light several reasons why networks are more
highly developed in Europe than in the United
States. The first is path dependence. The per-
sistence of small farms throughout the EU, and
particularly in France, Germany, and Italy (the
three largest producers), results from history
and geography, and from traditional rules reg-
ulating the transmission of land. Second, the
agricultural policy environment established by
the EU and the largest European countries in
the 1960s and 1970s to smooth the transition
from traditional to modern agriculture has en-
couraged the formation of networks, some of
which are officially promoted and supported
(e.g., in France or Italy). Third, as processors
and distributors have become larger and have
increased their requirements for quality, small
producers have established and maintained
networks to improve their bargaining posi-
tion. Fourth, new regulations regarding qual-
ity and increased pressure from consumers
for quality certification and identity preserva-
tion have given producers additional incen-
tive to coordinate their processes. Fifth, the
increase in global trade and the correspond-
ing need to coordinate with producers or dis-
tributors in other countries and regions, and
to deal with many layers of public authorities,
have also contributed to the movement toward
networking.
Some Critical Issues
The diversity of contracts and other organi-
zational arrangements observed across coun-
tries and regions, as well as recent changes in
how these arrangements are governed, raises
several problems. Agricultural production is
embedded in various and changing institu-
tional environments, yet producers compete
in increasingly global markets. At least two
issues deserve particular attention and need
a comparative approach that we, at ATOM
and CORI, are developing in cooperation with
other research centers.
Development) project associating seven European partners on the
food supply chain-issue, the DOLPHINS (Development of Ori-
gin Labelled Products: Humanity, Innovation and Sustainability)
project on the development of origin labeled products, and sev-
eral projects coordinated by KLICT (Ketennetwerken, Clusters,
and ICT), a Dutch organization. A U.S. example is a CORI survey
of corn and soy producers’ attitudes toward processors, analyzing
whether variation in “trust” can be explained by processor size,
ownership, and other characteristics.
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Are Networks a Stable Mode of Organization?
As described above, agricultural processes are
increasingly vertically integrated, while farm
ownership remains widely dispersed and farm-
ing remains a fairly decentralized activity. We
interpret the development of network organi-
zations as a tentative response to this imbal-
ance. Are networks a stable mode of organi-
zation, or are they merely a transitional form,
eventually giving way to consolidation and cor-
porate ownership at the producer level? Sim-
ilarly, do the new generation cooperatives
described above represent a new type of co-
operative or the beginning of the end of the
cooperative structure itself?
Much more research is needed to answer
these questions. First, we know little about the
efficiency of networks relative to more inte-
grated firms. There is obviously a greater need
for tight coordination, and formal contracts are
difficult to design and implement given agricul-
ture’s unique characteristics of seasonality and
uncertainty. Second, most networks not only
coordinate the marketing of their output but
also pool significant resources. As a result, ef-
ficient rules for sharing returns among network
members are difficult to design and implement.
Unfortunately, we know little about the shar-
ing rules used in various networks. Third, given
agriculture’s unique regulatory environment,
we need to examine if networks are mainly
the result of government policy rather than an
efficient means of reducing transaction costs
that could be effectively imitated in develop-
ing economies.
Policy Issues
These new forms of organization raise a
dilemma for agricultural policy makers. On the
one hand, regulators are concerned with in-
creasing concentration in the processing and
distribution sector and tightly coordinated
producer networks appear to counterbalance
that concentration. On the other hand, tightly
coordinated groups of legally independent
firms look like cartels. As Williamson has em-
phasized, competition authorities tend to take
an “inhospitable” approach to such nonstan-
dard contractual arrangements. Recent de-
bates within some competition agencies sug-
gest an increasing awareness of this dilemma,
though decisions tend to support the conven-
tional wisdom, which is based on a strong dis-
tinction between markets and integrated firms.
Reexamining competition policy through the
lens of transaction cost economics is an impor-
tant item on our research agendas.
Summary and Conclusions
The organization of food and agriculture, like
that of other sectors of the economy, is tightly
embedded in its institutional environment.
These background conditions should not be
regarded merely as constraints that hamper
modernization. They also create incentives for
the discovery of more efficient modes of orga-
nization. Comparing firms across different in-
stitutional environments to see what settings
facilitate organizational innovation and what
settings hamper it contributes dramatically to
our understanding of the dynamics of a mar-
ket economy. We regard the agrifood sector
as an exceptional setting for studying these
issues.
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